Democracy Debriefed is a weekly interpretive column that explains complex foreign and domestic policy issues. The views expressed are the author’s own.
Venezuela lays claim to the largest oil reserves in the world. Despite that massive potential, the Latin American state is undergoing one of the worst economic crises in the world. How does a country blessed by such large swaths of natural resources stand on the brink of collapse? The answer has been decades in the making.
When Hugo Chávez first came to power, global demand for oil was high thanks to large developing nations such as China. This gave Chávez the national wealth necessary to pursue his socialist agenda and consolidate power. His massive spending on social programs was based on the price of oil at the time, and overspending soon occurred as oil prices began to fall. His successor, Nicolás Maduro, continued the trend of overspending, just without the Chavismo, the sort of left-wing populism that made Chávez so successful. As global oil prices continued to drop, overspending continued by borrowing heavily from foreign sources. Today, Venezuela’s skyrocketing inflation and crime rates are risking the stability of the region, forcing other states to act.
In an effort to continue servicing foreign debt, Maduro has made power grabs in recent weeks. Most recently, he attempted to neuter the legislature with the aid of a pro-Maduro Supreme Court, raising international outrage. These ethical shortcomings, along with his continued mismanagement of national resources, have drawn the ire of the Organization of American States, an association of all independent North and South American countries. The Trump administration showed a willingness to take a tough stance on Maduro in February, when it imposed sanctions on Venezuela’s vice president over alleged narcotics trafficking. The allegation was bold, and the sanctions were narrowly tailored against the vice president himself, but further action that could bring about regime change or coax a long-lasting solution will require a more multifaceted approach.
Limited sanctions against individuals are a good start. A large part of Maduro’s rhetoric centers around opposition to perceived capitalist interference, notably the United States, which his administration accuses of attempting to oust him. Broad sanctions on the larger Venezuelan government would impede economic recovery, validating those claims in the eyes of voters. If sanctions are introduced, they should be targeted against Maduro’s inner circle, freezing financial assets and blocking them from investing offshore. Still, it would be ideal if the United States could be as far removed from the process as possible. To that end, Mexico would be an ideal substitute for U.S. leadership.
Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto has recently voiced his displeasure with Maduro, first instructing his foreign minister to raise the matter at an OAS meeting set for April 3, and then condemning the debate’s sudden cancellation. Mexico’s stern warnings are a departure from the traditionally practiced Estrada Doctrine, wherein Mexico avoids challenging the internal affairs of other nations. This could be a prime opportunity for the United States to tutor our southern ally, while also mending relations. Permitting Mexico to take the helm, whip the vote in the OAS and deliver a pragmatic solution to Venezuela’s crisis would allow the Trump administration to focus elsewhere. Not to mention, it would prevent poisoning the Latin American well with U.S. intervention that is often viewed as capitalist bullying. Once Mexico takes the reigns, diplomatic solutions can be leveraged through the OAS and precision sanctions that can be imposed on Maduro’s cadre.
Venezuela has yet to hold elections for state governorships or a recall referendum on Maduro himself, which were supposed to occur in 2016. That shortcoming in the democratic process, combined with Venezuela’s failure to deliver on basic humanitarian necessities, would help Mexico rally a vote to suspend Venezuela’s OAS membership until elections are held. At the same time, food and medicine should be brought in for distribution, but only through international supervision. Doing otherwise may allow the country’s notoriously corrupt local officials to manipulate the administration of supplies for their own gain. Finally, political prisoners, including opposition party members, must be released.
The nature of these goals shouldn’t be to oust Maduro, but instead to force him to allow the democratic process to take place. His low popularity and ineffectual leadership have run their course, and Venezuelans are eager for reform. The increased desperation of Venezuelans means that following through on these reforms may be Maduro’s best bet to prevent a violent overthrow.
Kyle Rempfer is a sophomore government & politics and Russian major. He can be reached at krempfer@terpmail.umd.edu.
