Nuclear Weapons
There is something strange about the United States’ preoccupation with Ukraine in that it has nothing to do with communism, which was its main concern regarding that country in decades past. But its old worries about communism didn’t single out regions in the Soviet Union for special attention. Its concern was for the whole empire and the rest of the world.
Before 1917, when Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire under the czars, the U.S. evinced little concern over Ukraine or anywhere else in the empire. That area of the world has returned to its pre-1917 political state of more-or-less right-wing authoritarian governments similar to the czars’, or at least of noncommunist governments, so why hasn’t the United States returned to its pre-1917 apathy toward Russia?
Is it because of nuclear weapons, which the czar obviously did not have? If so, this concern is misplaced, as Russia’s current interest in expanding its borders, possibly near the extent of the former Russian Empire, isn’t going to increase its nuclear capabilities by much.
Or is it a fear that Russia will become communist again if it doesn’t stay in the bounds of the existing Russian Federation? This fear also is unrealistic, as the fall of the USSR in 1991 didn’t require the breakup of the Soviet empire. Whatever the explanation, the United States might be passing up an opportunity to get Russia’s assent in introducing tactical nuclear weapons into the Middle East against ISIS.
Now, I’m not advocating actual use of tactical nukes, as even this might result in more harm than it prevents. But the main obstacle to the U.S. using nuclear weapons since perhaps the Korean War has not been technical, but that Russia was similarly armed. There was a fear of precipitating a nuclear holocaust if even tactical nuclear weapons were used, though President Dwight D. Eisenhower threatened their use in Korea in 1953 to end the Korean War. So I, like Eisenhower, am arguing for their threatened use, not actual use and perhaps for bringing weapons into the region of conflict, as Eisenhower did, to heighten their threatening power.
I am aware of that tried-and-true advice to never make a threat you’re not prepared to carry out. But I don’t think this applies to nuclear weapons. Merely suggesting their use can be enough to get results, even if the enemy is sure you won’t use them.
We didn’t really need to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. We could’ve unilaterally ended World War II in July 1945 after successfully testing the bomb, on whatever terms Japan was agreeable to, rather than fight on for about a month, and the world would be no worse off today. And if we had kept our nuclear monopoly after World War II, even if doing so had required some conventional weapons, we would have far greater prestige in the world today.
Certainly, we would need Russia’s OK to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, as Russian President Vladimir Putin would need our OK to introduce them into some local situation, which probably has been the case since at least the Korean War.
And Putin’s approval would perhaps be forthcoming. After all, Russia is an ally of Syria, and Syria has benefited from the conventional bombing of ISIS by the Obama administration.
Jonathan S. Miller is a geography graduate student. He can be reached jsmiller@umd.edu.
